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Book Reviews

Rubin, Jared. Rulers, Religion, & Riches: Why the West
Got Rich and the Middle East Did Not. New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2017.
Economists are valued chiefly for their ability to tell people how to get
rich. While there are countless specialties within the field, there are two
main divisions: forecasting – how an individual or firm can gain by
knowing the future – and development – how a whole country can become
more prosperous by repeating the successes of the past. This book
decidedly is in the second category. Rubin presents a theory that clearly
addresses the development issue in an entirely fresh way. He finds that the
relationship between government and religious leaders determined the
treatment of wealth-producing advances. These relationships differed
between the West and the Middle East. When the government needed the
endorsement of the religious leaders, those religious leaders often used
their influence to block economically beneficial changes and created
poverty. Independent governments, more common in the West, lacked the
incentive or the ability to block these changes. Max Weber (1905) argued
that “the Protestant work ethic” was the secret to a successful economy,
but several sociologists and economists produced compelling arguments
against this theory in the 20th century. Now, in the 21st century, Jared Rubin
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and other researchers are reexamining the role religion plays in wealth
production.
The most interesting aspect of Rubin’s work is that the Middle East
was once far ahead of the western world, not only in wealth, but in
intellectual achievements, scientific advances and urban population, good
markers for productivity. In 800 CE, the most developed economies were
centered on the fertile crescent (Bagdad) and southern Spain, both
predominantly Islamic. Christian areas were virtually all poor. Soon, this
pattern began to change. Commercial development took a northern route
through Italy to the rest of Europe. By the eighteenth century, while
Europe did not completely dominate the Middle East, Islamic cities and
their attendant civilizations consisted of only Istanbul, Cairo and Tunis.
Today, the only Islamic countries with high per-capita GDPs are a few
where oil revenue has been retained by a very small proportion of a small
population.
What happened? Rubin explores this question in extensively
researched detail. He finds most of the impact came from the widely
divergent attitudes that Western European and Middle Eastern rulers
assumed toward two important developments. The first was the
acceptance of charging interest for loans. Banking is an accelerant to
development. Spreading money widely and easily allows growth, and
withholding funds from new ventures is a sure method of stifling increased
efficiency and production. Charging interest motivates the movement of
capital to its most productive use. The Islamic religion in general opposes
charging interest. Christians opposed it also, but as Jewish lenders were
readily available, governments became increasingly likely to look the
other way. The opposition of both Islamic and Christian leaders to interest
was weakened in the 14th century by the rapid rise of commercial banking,
which seemed obviously different than consumer borrowing. The
Christian leaders caved, but even today “ruses” are needed to make Islamic
banking legitimate (for example, the borrower is required to give an equity
share to the lender, or even purchase an extravagantly over-priced object).
The printing press was the second development that separated the two
regions. Johannes Gutenberg developed the moveable-type printing press
in 1450. By 1500, most major western European cities had at least one of
these marvels. Bibles were the first books printed, which was fine with the
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church as long as the language was Latin. Yet the variety and quantity of
printed material quickly soared. Information, advertisements and political
flyers were all common in cities by the next century. Merchants demanded
the publication of books on mathematics and commerce. Literacy naturally
rose with the number of publications, which increased worker
productivity. However, in Ottoman territory, the reaction to the printing
press was violently negative. In 1515, Sultan Selim I decreed that
“occupying oneself with the science of printing was punishable by death.”
(p. 105). Islamic religious authorities only allowed printing presses to
produce works in Arabic in 1727 (p. 100).
For both innovations, the difference in acceptance had the same basis:
political leaders in Islamic countries counted more heavily on the support
of religious leaders to maintain their legitimacy. Political leaders in
Western Europe solicited the support of religious leaders, but did not
depend on it (see Henry VIII).
Rubin adds depth to his arguments by describing in some detail the
development of England and the Dutch Republic, representing Western
Europe, and Spain and the Ottoman Empire, representing the Middle East.
England threw off the yoke of Catholic approval, and the Dutch traders
never had to bear it. These countries thrived in the 15th and 16th centuries.
Spain’s increasing dependence on revenue supplied by the Catholic church
(even missionaries in California sent money home) meant that the church
had nearly unquestioned power. The once stunning economic success of
the Ottomans was eroded by the fact that the population became
increasingly Muslim over time, so the importance to the government of
Islamic religious rules increased.
The importance of this book goes far beyond religion. Rubin points
out that it is not even about religion: “Islam itself is not the problem.
However, economic success is less likely to occur where religion plays an
important role in politics. But this is not to lay blame on religion in general,
either; any interest group that has a powerful seat at the political
bargaining table but does not have interest consistent with economic
growth will play a retarding role in a society’s economy.” (p. xiv) This
book raises important questions that cover economics, religion, sociology,
political science and many other areas. It is accessible and thoughtprovoking for any reader.
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